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AMERICAN JOURNAL
of POLICE SCIENCE
LEGAL PITFALLS TO AVOID IN CRIMINAL
INTERROGATIONS
Fred E. Inbau
Fred E. Inbau, Professor of Law, Northwestern University, needs no introduction
to our readers. For a number of years he capably served as Editor of this JOURNAL
and is now its Managing Director. Professor Inbau has contributed a number of
important papers dealing with criminal law and scientific evidence to this and other
professional journals, and his book, "Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation" is
recognized as the authoritative work in its field. Because of the many recent decisions on the admissibility of confessions obtained by police interrogators this
timely article should do much to clear up the confusion on the subject in the minds
of criminal investigators and prosecuting attorneys.-EDIToa.

The cloud of uncertainty that has hovered over the law of
confessions as a result of several United States Supreme Court
decisions of the past few years has been dissipated to some
extent by the Court's rulings and opinions in four very recent
cases.1 It now appears reasonably safe to venture a few concrete suggestions and recommendations to criminal interrogators as to what they can and cannot do in the interrogation of
criminal suspects.
THE PROBLEM IN FEDERAL CASES

Federal investigators undoubtedly will welcome the implication attending the Supreme Court's refusal to review a decision
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Garnerv.
United States.2 In this case the defendants had been arrested
at night, after the federal commissioner's office had closed, and
confessions were made by each defendant within a few hours
after their arrest. The next morning they were duly arraigned,
and a subsequent trial resulted in their conviction for murder.
Defense counsel contended at the trial and in the Court of Appeals that the confessions were inadmissible as evidence because
they were obtained during a period of delay in arraignment.
For their authority in support of this contention counsel for
the defendants relied upon the United States Supreme Court
decisions and opinions in the McNabb and Upshaw cases, which
had developed the so-called "civilized standard" rule of interrogation for federal officers and branded as invalid any confession obtained by federal investigators during a period of "un1 For a detailed discussion of the uncertainty which prevailed, see the writer's
article on "IThe Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court" (1948)
43 Ill. L. Rev. 442, and his book "Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation" (2d
ed., 1948), 150-169. The four cases referred to are cited infra notes 2, 7, 8, and 9.
2 174 F. (2d) 499 (1949) ; cert. denied, 69 Sup. Ct. 1502 (June 20, 1949).
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necessary" delay in taking the arrested person before a commissioner for arraignment as required by law.3
In a 2 to 1 decision of the Garner case the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the arresting officers were
only required to avoid "unnecessary" delays, and that the absence of a federal commissioner made a delay in the arraignment
until the next morning a necessary one, thereby placing this
particular case situation beyond the orbit of the McNabbUpshaw rule of exclusion. The dissenting judge, in his interpretation of the Supreme Court's views as expressed in the
McNabb and Upshaw cases, adopted the position that even
though the commissioner's office was closed, the police should
have attempted to locate a committing magistrate. He reasoned
that "unless at least one magistrate is always available, secret
interrogation cannot be prevented," an objective he assumed to
be implicit in the Supreme Court's previous opinions.
In view of the split decision of the Court of Appeals, and in
the light of the Supreme Court's great concern over confession
cases, there was good reason to believe that the Supreme Court
might grant the defendants' petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals. To the contrary, however, the Supreme
Court denied the defendants' petition, thereby rendering final
the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial court conviction.
A refusal to review, under the circumstances involved in the
Garnercase, is a reasonable indication that the Supreme Court,
or at least a majority of the Court, approved the decision of the
court below. The net effect of the Garner case seems to be this:
If an arrest is made by federal officers at a time when a federal
commissioner is unavailable for arraignment (e.g., at night, on
holidays, etc.), a confession obtained before a commissioner is
available will not be considered invalid merely because it was
made prior to the arraignment. This rule may well be conditioned in later cases, of course, upon the presence of good faith
on the part of the arresting officers in not purposely postponing
a contemplated arrest to take advantage of a commissioner's
absence.
The basic rule of the McNabb and Upshaw cases still stands,
of course. It is in no way altered by the refusal to review the
Garnercase. Federal officers are still duty bound, therefore, to
take an arrested person before a commissioner for arraignment
"without unnecessary delay." The Garner case ruling does
mean, however, that an otherwise proper interrogation may
follow an arrest which is effected (in good faith) at a time when
a commissioner is unavailable for arraignment proceedings.
SMcNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v. U.S., 335 U.S. 410 (1949).
For a discussion of the McNabb-Upshaw doctrine, see 43 Ill. L. Rev. 442.
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THE PROBLEM I

STATE CASES

Prior to 1944 the United States Supreme Court, in its review
of state court confession cases, applied the usual voluntary-trustworthy test of admissibility. In other words, the practice of the
court in such cases was to determine from the trial court record
whether the court and jury acted reasonably in holding that the
defendant's confession had not been "forced" out of him, or,
stated somewhat differently, "had not been obtained in a manner
which rendered it untrustworthy." If the Supreme Court decided that the evidence clearly indicated force, and therefore
untrustworthiness, the "due process'-' clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution would be invoked and
the case reversed. On the other hand, if the record did not
clearly disclose coercion or untrustworthiness, the Court would
accept as final the state courts' findings that the confession was
voluntary or trustworthy. In 1944, however, after the court had
reversed several state court convictions which involved some
rather shocking examples of police abuses of accused persons,
particularly Southern negroes charged with crimes against white
victims, the Supreme Court departed from the conventional
vbluntary-trustworthy test of confession admissibility and laid
down a much more critical one in Ashcraft v. Tennessee.4 In
that case a divided Court (6-3) made what appears to be an
abstract psychological appraisal of the thirty-six hour interrogation of the defendant and decided that an interrogation of
that duration was "inherently coercive," for which reason the
confession would be held inadmissible regardless of the effect of
the police practices upon the particular defendant and regardless of the otherwise trustworthiness of the confession.
A careful reading of the opinion of the majority of the Court,
considered along with several subsequent Supreme Court decisions, seemed to indicate that what the majority of the Justices
wanted to accomplish was to impose a higher, "civilized" standard of investigative practices upon state law enforcement officers, a standard somewhat similar to that prescribed for federal
officers in the McNabb and Upshaw cases. Unlike the federal
cases, however, the Court could not do this directly, because of
the absence of constitutional authority for any such inroads
upon state government. 5 But the same attempt was practically
available by extending the Court's interpretation of "due
process" to prohibit "inherently coercive" interrogation practices.
For several years following the Ashcraft case it appeared that
4 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
5 In its review of federal cases the Supreme Court can exercise its "supervisory"
power over lower federal courts and federal officers; as regards state courts and

FRED B. INBAU

[Vol. 40

the growing restrictions on state interrogation practices would
soon eliminate the opportunity for effective interrogation of
criminal suspects. This possibility seemed quite imminent after
the 5 to 4 decision in Haley v. Ohio,6 a 1948 case in which a
reversal was ordered for the conviction of a 15 year old negro
defendant who had been questioned for five hours by several
police officers "in relays of one or two each." The majority
opinion stated that in any case where the undisputed evidence
"suggested" that coercion was used the conviction would be
reversed "even though without the confession there might have
been sufficient evidence for submission to the jury." On June
27, 1949, however, the Supreme Court decided three state confession cases, in which there are some indications that the Court,
or a majority of its members anyway, is prepared to relax the
demands previously imposed by the Court upon state interrogators.
In the three recent cases of Watts v. Indiana,7 Turner r. Penn9 each of the defendants
sylvania,8 and Harrisv. South Carolina,
had been subjected to extensive interrogations over a period of
several days and by relays of police officers. By a 6-3 decision
in the Watts case, and a 5-4 decision in the Turner and Harris
cases, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions. In each case
four members of the court-Justices Douglas, Frankfurter,
Murphy, and Rutledge-found fault not only with the length of
the interrogation and the relay method of questioning, but also
with (a) the failure to take the defendants before a committing
magistrate for a preliminary hearing, (b) the absence of
"friendly or professional aid" at the time of their interrogation,
and (c) the neglect to advise the defendants of their constitutional rights. One of the four, Justice Douglas, even went so
far as to favor the outlawing of any confession, however freely
given, if it is obtained during a period of custody between arrest and arraignment. 0 The encouraging indications previously
mentioned as being evidenced in these cases are obviously not
present in the attitudes expressed by the aforementioned justices. They are found, however, in the dissenting opinions of
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Burton, Jackson, and Reed,
and in the fact that although Justice Black approved of a reversal of the convictions he was persuaded by the "inherent
coerciveness" of the extensive, relay interrogation practices in
state officers, however, the Court can only operate within the authority granted it by
constitutional provisions. As regards state court confessions, therefore, the Supreme
Court cannot reverse a conviction for the avowed purpose of disciplining state
officers, whereas in federal cases, the Court does have that inherent power. McNabb
v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
6 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
7 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949).
10 See 69 S. Ct. 1357.
8 69 S. Ct. 1352 (1949).
9 69 S. Ct. 1354 (1949).
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these cases rather than by the three other considerations (a, b,
and c above) mentioned by Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge.
The dissenting opinions rather clearly indicated that four of
the justices thought that the test of a confession's admissibility
should be its trustworthiness. "Checked with external evidence," the confessions were considered "inherently believable," and "not shaken as to truth by anything that occurred at
the trial," Justice Jackson, who authored the dissenting opinions in two of the *cases, pointed right to the crux of the whole
confession problem when he stated that all three crimes were
unwitnessed, and that there was no way to solve them without
taking suspects into custody for questioning. He added that
there were only these alternatives: "to close the books on the
crime and forget it," or to take suspects into custody for questioning-" a grave choice for a society in which two-thirds of the
murders already are closed out as insoluble." He further commented that if the Constitution required the Supreme Court to
hold that a state may not take into custody and question one
suspected reasonably of an unwitnessed murder, "the people of
this country must discipline themselves to seeing their police
stand by helplessly while those suspected of murder prowl about
unmolested."
With four of the nine justices thus firmly committed to the
trustworthiness test of confession admissibility, is there not
some practical adjustment that state interrogators may make
in their interrogation practices in order to comply with the demands of some one or more of the remaining five' justices?
With three of the five justices, the interrogator's situation must
be classed as a rather hopeless one, for he obviously cannot
conduct an effective interrogation in the presence of the accused
person's counsel, friends or relatives; nor is it ordinarily feasible to conduct a satisfactory interrogation after the arrested
person has been promptly arraigned." However, as regards one
or two of the justices who have usually concurred in the reversal
of convictions in these confession cases, the indications are that
even though they have indicated or expressed their concern over
the police deviations from so-called "civilized standards," the
fundamental considerations were the factors of continuous
lengthy interrogations by officers working in relays-factors
which may, of course, render a confession untrustworthy.1 2 - It is
11 For a discussion of the conditions and circumstances required for an effective
interrogation, see (1948) 43 Ill. L. Rev. 442, at pp. 447-451.
12 Justice Black's reasons for reversing the Watts, Turner and Harris cases, sMpra
notes 7, 8, and 9, were apparently based upon these larger considerations. Justice
Frankfurter, although the author of the "civilized standards" rule for federal
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the writer's opinion, therefore, that one or two additional justices may be won over to the law enforcement side of the confession controversy if state interrogators will:
1. Avoid continuous lengthy interrogations; and
2. Avoid the practice of relay questioning.
An abandonment of these two practices should contribute
much toward a better future record for the prosecution in confession cases before the Supreme Court. The recent demise of
Justice Murphy, who so staunchly applied the doctrine of "civilized standards" in his efforts to protect the interests of accused persons, and his replacement by Attorney General Tom
Clark, is another factor pointing to the expectation of fewer
reversals of future state court confession cases because of considerations going beyond the test of trustworthiness.
THE NECESSITY FOR SPECIALLY SELECTED AND TRAI.NED

POLICE INTERROGATORS

To modify current interrogation methods to the extent demanded for Supreme Court approval will require the establishment of police practices whereby the responsibility for interrogating suspects and witnesses is assigned to police personnel
who are specially selected and trained for that purpose. In order
to conduct effective interrogations within a reasonable and legally permissible period of time, the task of interrogation must
be the responsibility of a trained specialist, and not the chore
of any officer who happens to be assigned to the case, for the'
qualifications of an interrogator are vastly different from those
which may mark an excellent general investigator.
An effective interrogator must have a good practical understanding of human nature generally. He must possess personality traits such as are evidenced by a general ability to "get
along" with people and to be well liked by his friends and
associates. He must also be a man of patience, with an intense
interest in the work itself. A coupling of these basic qualifications with a relatively short period of instruction from an experienced competent interrogator in the art of criminal interrogation will make available to any police department a service of
immense practical value. A man or unit of men with these
various qualifications will be able to solve many crimes by means
of confessions which will successfully stand the test of admissibility not only in the state courts but in the United States Supreme Court as well.
officers, apparently looks for more basic considerations in state cases. See his
dissent in the Ashcraft case, supra note 4, and also his concurrence in the decision
affirming the conviction in Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).

